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Introduction 
Much, if not most, of the interaction between an individual and his 
environment involves dealing with classes or categories of things. The 
tremendous diversity one encounters in everyday life is necessarily coded 
into a smaller number of categories to simplify the environment. The 
process by which concepts are acquired and used are of typical interest 
to psychologists. 
In concept attainment problems an arbitrary scheme (e.g. con~unct1ve 
rule) combines certain attributes to define a concept. The subject is 
required to discover the concept through an inductive process based on the 
observation of a set of positive and negative inetances. Infol'llation 
about the correct concept is presented in bits and pieces, on a trial-by-
trial basis, until the subject arrives at the solution. 
One of the oldest questions in problem solving concerns comparisons 
of group and individual efforts. Within thia general area, the concept 
of social facilitation is central, but over the past aeveral decades 
previous research has given conflicting results: compared with the solu-
tions arrived at by individuals working in isolation, problem solving in 
a group is sometimes facilitative and sometimes inhibiting_ Hare (1962) 
rather unspectacularly concluded that "the presence of others working on 
the same task has been found to stimulate some individuals to greater 
productivity, distract others, and leave others tmaffected." The group 
situation may either increase an individual's activity if he is motivated 
by implied competition, or depress activity through distraction, conformity 
to norms, or group resistance to the task. "Most studies can be seen as 
-1-
dealing with the same fundamental problem of identifying the factors whic:h 
define optimal condition. for maximum productivity in problem solving 
(Van de Geer and Jaspers, 1966)." 
A nUllber of studies have been concerned with how the skills of the 
group members combine. Although there is some evidence (Ryack, 1965) for 
a pooling model, it seems that the group problem situation 18 typically 
more than just a combination of individuals who jWlt ha,pen to be in a 
group. In this respect, Hall, Mouton, and Blake '(1963) showed in tasks 
requiring several complex judgements, that interacting groups were signifi-
cantly superior to the pooled _cores of the separate individuals. That 
there may, under certain circumatances, also be an interactive effect on 
the abilitie_ of individual members was demon_trated by Goldman (1965), 
who found that the partner of lower ability in a two-man group increased 
hi_ ability as a result of the group problem solving experunce. Thus, 
a task such as concept attainment in which there is room for contll1.derablc 
improvement in the abilities of the individual members may get an added 
impetus due to the increase in problem solving skill of low ability 
members. Under these circumstances a simple pooling model is inadequate 
for predicting performance. Thomas and Fink (1961) indicated that a 
pooling ("independence") model may be applicable for complex tasks, however, 
if discussion or communication between group members was not po.sib1e--o~ 
not allowed. 
Attempts to relate the outcome of a group's problem _olving efforts 
to the ability of the group membefs have been beset by two o .. ie problema: 
differences in talk demands of the many types of problems used, and the 
2 
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consequent difficulty of specifying the particular abilities relevant to 
the tasks. While it may be true, for example, that mathmatical reasoning 
scores on general intelligence tests are positively correlated with 
individual success on deductive reasoning problems~ they are completely 
uncorrelated with success on certain sudden insight problems. Boffman 
(1965) has brought up these difficulties and noted that experimental 
evidence as to any relationship between member ability and group proficiency 
is inconsistant. 
Apart from the differences between individual and g~oup and the way 
in which the abilities of the group members combine, several other factors 
have been examined in group studies. "Two factors appear to stand jut as 
facilitating effective problem solving: the members' motivation to work 
cooperatively on the problem, and the diversity of the points of view and 
information relevant to the problem within the group (Boffman. 1965)." 
Boffman (1961) has attributed the auece8s ot heterogeneous gra~ps in 
problem solving to the presence of more different kinds of ideas or 
different possible directions available for approaching the problem. But 
unless given a free atmosphere"in the group. the right solution may b~ 
suppressed (Maier & Solem. 1952). It is apparent that even when dive~.ity 
exists in a group, the .~ried viewpoints are not always heard~ If all 
ideas are to be communl~ated and considered by the group then, it is 
important that they be aired and discussed. The best known factor in this 
area-~hich has not been too clearly distinguished from social facilitation--
has to do with the effeet of brainstOrming instructions on effective and 
creative problem solving. 
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Osborn (1953) offered the brainstorming technique in which an eva1uation-
free period of idea production helps prevent discard of potentially good 
solutions before all ideas are in. The technique has been used primarily 
in applied research,and since there have been no experimental tests of 
the superiority of brainstorming to free discussion in the problem solving 
situation it is very difficult to evaluate. The value of discussion of 
some sort to effective problem solving, though, is unquestionable. 
In the concept attainment situation, where the complex nature of the 
task makes a long-range, in-depth view of the situation particularly 
beneficial, the effects of discussion are most important. 
Most studies of conceptual behavior have employed one or another 
variation of what has been called the reception paradigm--in which the 
experimenter successively presents stimuH. to the sub.iect. A more recent 
and widely used methodological development is the selection paradigm, owing 
largely to the work of Bruner, et a1. (1956). In this situaUon the subject 
is presented with an array of cards varying in number of attributes (shape, 
color, etc.) with two or more values of each attribute (triangle or square, 
red or green, etc.). The experimenter then arbitrarily designates a 
combination of two or more values as a concept, and indicates an initial 
card satisfying this concept. The subject's task is to then determine 
the pre-designated combination by choosing a series of cards, learning 
whether or not each card exemplifies the concept, and thus solving the 
problem in as few card choices as possible (Laughlin and McGlynn, 1968). 
In contrast to the reception technique, '~ere the subject is in a 
sense at the mercy of the experimenter (Bourne, 1966)," in the selection 
paradigm the subject gathers information on his own. This technique makes 
it possible to determine from stimulus selections (and corresponding 
hypotheses) whether or nbt the subject is using any systematic plan of 
attack or strategy in the problem. If he knows how to go about it, he can 
use very effective strategies, and acquire the necessary information in a 
minimum number of trials (Bourne, 1966). 
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Bruner et al. (1956) distinguished between two basic strategies, 
Focusing and Scanning, in the concept attainment situation. In scanning, 
the subject tests specific hypotheses either singly (successive scanning), 
all at once (simultaneous scanning), or some intermediate number. While 
simultaneous scanning is the theoretically optimal strategy to minimize card 
choices to solution, it has been found too difficult for most people to use 
because of excessive inference and memory demands. As a result, many 
persons adopt a strategy of focusing in which attributes rather than specific 
hypotheses are tested. In focusing, the subject tests the relevance of all 
the possible hypotheses concerning a particular attribute or attributes by 
choosing a card differing in one (conservatiVe focusing} or more (focus 
gambling) attributes from a positive focus card. A positive choice card 
indicates that the value changed is irrelevant to the concept, a negative 
choice card that it is essential. Memory and inference requirements are 
thus lessened, which Bruner at al. interpret as the explanation for focusing 
being generally a more effective strategy. Laughlin (1965, 1966) has 
formulated quantitative rules for the scoring of focusing and scanning 
strategies for conjunctive problems. 
Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) have note4 that although this paradigm 
has been applied primarily to studies of individual cognitive processes, 
recent studies have related it to group problem solving. Laughlin (1965) 
found that two person cooperative groups required fewer card choices to 
solution, had fewer untenable hypotheses, and adopted a focusing strategy 
more than individuals. After application of the Taylor-McNemar correction 
model (1955) the group superiority in terms of card choices was no longer 
found, but their advantage in terms of focusing strategy remained. 
Laughlin and Doherty (1967) analyzed this group superiority in terms 
of the relative influence of discussion and memory factors, comparing 
conditions in which discussion and paper were or were not allowed to 
cooperative pairs. Discussion groups solved the problems in fewer card 
choices and fewer untenable hypotheses than groups not allowed discussion; 
memory had no effect. Complex relationships were found for the adoption 
of focusing and scanning strategi.s in the interactions of discussion, 
memory, stimulus display, and rule difficulty. 
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T,le effects of discussion were made clear when Laughlin and McGlynn 
(1968) found that two cooperative individuals were more effective in 
problem solving than ewo competitive individuals in terms of number of card 
choices to solution, fewer untenable hypotheses, and more use of focusing 
strategy t although they required more time. Through discussion the 
cooperative pairs were able to monitor and evaluate each other's card 
choices and hypotheses and develop the empirically more effective focusing 
strategy. Cooperative groups were thus found to hold the same advantage 
over competitive groups as groups over. ind:1..viduals. No sex differ.ences 
were found in problem solving performances or the use of strategies, 
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although males required more time. This was taken to indicate that usual 
male superiority in problem solving (Dunca~ 1961; Van de Geer & Jaspers, 
1966) may be due to motivation rather than capacity. It was concluded that 
the concept attainment situation was sufficiently interesting for females 
to motivate their performance on a level with males. 
In the Laughlin and McGlynn study, a steady imporvament over five 
problems was found in terms of number of card ch0ices. fO~1sin8 strategy, 
and number of untenable hypotheses which was attributed to a social 
facilitation effect found in both cooperative and competitive pairs. But 
this finding represents a departure from the continuity of this line of 
research. Laughlin and Jordan (1967) had noted that interprob1em transfer 
did commonly take place with experimenter programming of instance or 
reception strategies (e.g. Neisser & Weene, 1962; Wells, 1962; Wells & 
Watson, 1965; Haygood & Bourne, 1965) and did not occur with subject 
selection of instances (e.g. Bruner et a1., 1956; Conant & Trabasso, 1964; 
Laughlin, 1966). And the Laughlin and Jordan and Laughlin and Doherty 
studies have supported t~is observation. But the interproblem trausler 
found by Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) raised a new question as to whether 
relection paradigm studies could, in fact, commonly expect to find no 
interprob1em transfer effects. 
The existence of discussion as an aid in concept attainment is clear 
. 
(Laughlin & Doherty, 1967; Laughlin & McGlynn, 1968). but there is question 
as to'how this process effects t~e improvement, or advantage, over non-
discussion situations. 
Thus, the present experiment investigated interprob1em transfer effects 
and the role of discussion in the concept attainment situation. Thfs was 
accomplished by varying the amount of discussion al.lowed to cooperative 
groups on three conjunctive problems. It was expected that increasing 
amounts of discussion would result in more efficient problem solving in 
terms of greater use of focusing strategy, fewer untenable hypotheses, and 
fewer card choices to solution. Analysis of the effects of discussion was 
made both in terms of problems and hypotheses. 
Method 
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Desi~ and subjects. A 3 x 3 x 3 repeated measures factorial design 
was used with the variables: (1) discussion allowed on problems (first, 
first and second, all three); (2) discussion allowed on hypotheses (first 
two, first four, first six), (3) problems (three for each pair of subjects). 
Subjects were 180 students (90 m~le and 90 female) from two Chicago 
schools, Mundelein College and Loyola University. Ten like-sex pairs (half 
male, half female) were randomly assigned to each of the nine experimental 
conditions. 
Stimulus display and problems. The stimulus display was exactly the 
same as that used by Laughlin and McGlynn (1968): a 28 x 44 inch white 
posterboard containing an 8 x 8 ar~ay of 64 2 1/4 x 4 inch cards drawn in 
colored ink with dark outlines. The 64 cards represented all possible 
combinations of six attributes with two levels of each. '11le display consisted 
of all combinatic:·ns of six plus and/or minus signs in a row. In order to 
facilitate reference to the six positions, each was a different color, so 
that the color name was the attribute and plus or minus the value of each 
color. The 64 cards were arranged systematically in relation to the other 
cards, for example, the fi~st color (blue) was plus in the top four rows, 
minus in the bottom four. The problems were conjunctive concepts with 
three relevant attributes (e.g. ''blue minus, green plus, red plus"). Each 
problem and initial card for each pair of subjects was randomly assigned 
from the set of three-~ttribute conjunctive concepts and the subset of 
possible initial cards for each subject. All pairs solved three problems. 
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Procedure. The meaning of conjunctive concepts was thoroughly 
explained to the subjects, and the concept rule was typed on a reference 
card accessible to them throughout the experiment. The instructions 
explained the nature of the task, pointed 011t the systematic arrangement of 
the attributes and values on the display, and emphasized that the problems 
were to be solved in as few card choices as possible, regardless of time 
(Laughlin, 1964). 
All pairs were told to work together and that they could discuss the 
problems and their card choices and hypotheses. 1bey were told to alternate 
in actually selecting each card and stating the accompanying hypothesis ••. 
"because at some point during the problem I will stop the discussion after 
which you may not communicate except to state your card choices and hypo-
theses in turn." 
The person who selected the first card and made the first hypothesis 
was determined by a coin flip before the first problem. Subjects then 
alternated in starting off the second and third problems. 
Results 
Four response meaSur.88 were analyzed: number of card choices to 
solution, focB;3ing strategy, percentage of untenable hypotheses, and 
time to solution. 
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Card choices to solution. The mean number of card choices to selution 
-- -
for the nine treatment groups for each of the three problems are presented 
in Table 1. A summary of the analysis of variance is pres@nted in Table 2. 
The effect of problems (the number of problems on which discussion 
was allowed) was significant at the .001 level, F (2,81) • 8.617. Duncan 
multiple-range comparisons were performed on the three problem ~ondition8 
summing over the three hypotheses conditions. Discussion on two problems 
was significantly superior to discussion on just one problem (~<:.05). 
And discussion on all three problems was significantly superior both to 
discussion on two problems (~<.001) and to diseussion on one problem 
The analysis of variance also revealed a significant effect for 
hypotheses (the number of hypotheses on which discussion was allowed), 
F (2,81) • 4.9547, ~ (.01. Duncan multiple-range comparisons were per-
formed on the three hypotheses conditions summing over the three problem 
conditions. There was a progressive improvement in the number of card 
choices to solution, varying directly with the number of hypotheses on 
wh~ch diseussion was allowed. Discussion on four hypotheses required 
aignificant1y fewer card choiees than discussion on two hypotheses (~<.Ol). 
Discussion on three hypotheses required significantly fewer choices than 
either four (~<.OS) or two (~<.OOl) hypotheses. There was no significant 
effect on card choices due to trials (first, second, and third probleitts): 
None 'of the interactions were significant. 
Focusing Strategy. The rulcs for scoring focusing strategy were 
taken from Laughlin (1965) and Laughlin and Jordan (1967). They are given 
in detail below. 
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Table 1 
Mean Number of Card Choices for the Nine 
Discussion Conditions for Three Trials 
Discussion Trials 
Problems-Hypotheses 1 2 3 Total 
one-two 5.4 6.6 5.8 17.80 
one-four 5.<; 6.9 5.3 16.70 
one-six 4.8 4.7 4.9 14.40 
two-two 5.2 5.4 4.5 15.10 
two-four 4.4 5.1 4.8 14.30 
two-::;;ix 4.8 3.5 4.0 12.30 
three-two 4.7 5.0 4.8 14.50 
three-four 4.5 4.1 3.4 12.01') 
three-six 4.4 3.8 3.5 11.70 
Total 4.86 5.01 4.56 14.43 
Table 2 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for 
Card Choices to Solution 
Source df 55 MS 
Problems (P) 2 80 40.0 
Hypotheses (H) 2 46 23.:1 
P x H 4 9 2.25 
Error (B) 81 376 4.5420 
Trials (T) 2 10 5.0 
TxP 4 11 2.75 
TxH 4 16 4.0 
T x P x H 8 12 1.5 
Error (W) 162 658 4.()67 
•• ~ < .01 
•• *I? < .001 
F 
8.617··· 
4.9547·· 
1.23 
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Rule 1: Each card choice had to obtain information on one new attribute. 
';ew information was obtained if the card choice altered either one attribute 
not previously proven irrelevant (conservative focusing), or more than one 
attribute (focus gambling), providing that in altering more than one 
attribute, the instance was either positive or that the ambiguous information 
was correctly resolved on the next card choice by Altering only one 
attribute. Rule 2: If a hypothesis was made it h~d tr be tenable consid-
ering the information available. tmtenable hypothe.es were of three types: 
(a) a hypothesis for a value of an attribute when the other value had 
previously occurred on a positive instance; (b) a hypothesis which had 
previously occurred on a negative instance. and (c) a repetition of a 
previously given hypothesis. 
Each card choice and accompanying hypothesis that satisfied these rules 
was counted as an instance of focusing, and the total number of such in-
stances was divided by the total number of card choices to derive a focusing 
score on a continuum from .00 to 1.00. 
The mean focusing scores for the nine treatment groups for each of the 
three problems are presented in Table 3. A summary of the analysis of 
variance is presented in Table 4. 
The analysis revealed a significant effect of discussion over problems, 
F (2,81) • 9.1925, ~~ .001. Duncan mUltiple-range comparisons were 
performed on the thr~~ p~oblem co~ditions summing over the three hypotheses 
conditions. Discussion on two problems proved to be significantly superior 
in terms of focusing scores than discussion on just one problem (~<.OOl). 
And discussion on three problems was significantly more conducive to higher 
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Table 3 
Mean Focusing Scores for the Nine 
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems 
Discussion Trials 
Problems-Hypotheses 1 2 3 Total 
one-two .486 .341 .423 1. 250 
one-four .IJ49 .291 .511 1.251 
one-sIx .453 .468 .513 1.434 
two-two .472 .421 .495 1.388 
two-four .630 .641 .447 1.718 
two-six .479 .714 .562 1.755 
three-two .626 .572 .536 1. 734 
three-four .635 .719 .716 2.'170 
three-!,ix .498 .(;67 .699 1.864 
Total .525 .537 .545 1.607 
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Table 4 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for Focusing 
Source df S8 MS F 
Problems (P) 2 1.6712 .8356 9.1925*** 
Hypotheses (H) 2 .3366 .1683 1.8515 
P x H 4 .2017 .0504 
Error (B) 81 7.3669 .0909 
Trials 2 .()171 • ()O86 
T x P 4 .4287 .1072 1 • .5163 
TxH 4 .4267 .1067 1.5092 
T x E x H 8 .3800 .0475 
Error (W) 162 11.4509 .0707 
***:2. <.001 
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focusing scores than both discussion on two problems (~<.Ol) and discussion 
on one problem only (~<. i)Ol). There were no significant effects due to 
hypotheses or trials. 
Untenable hypotheses. The mean percentages of untenable hypotheses 
for the nine treatment groups for each of the three problems are presented 
in Table 5. A summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 6. 
The analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for hypotheses, 
F (2,81) • 4.231, ~ < .115. Duncan multiple-range comparisons were perfo-rmed 
on the three hypotheses conditions summing over the three problem conditions. 
Discussion on six hypotheses was found to reduce significantly the pe=-
centage of untenable hypotheses as compared with discussion on four hypotheses 
(P.:< .~1l) and discussion on just two hypotheses (~(.001). The difference 
between four hypotheses and two hypotheses, however, was not significant. 
There were no other significant main effects and there were no significant 
interactions. 
Time ~ solution. The mean time to solution (in minutes) for the nine 
discussion groups for each of the three problems is presented in Table 1. 
A summary of the analysis of variance is presented in Table 8. 
The analysis of variance revealed a significant effect for trials, 
F (2,162) • 29.5633, ~<.OOl. Duncan multiple-range comparisons between 
problems revealed that the second problem required significantly less time 
to solve than the first (~<:.001), and the third problem required significant-
ly less time to solve than either the second (~(.001) or the first (~<.OOl). 
There were no other signi.icant main effects and there were no significant 
interactions. 
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Table 5 
Mean Untenable Hypotheses Ratios for the Nine 
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems 
Discussion Trials 
Problems-Hypotheses 1 2 3 Total 
one-two .259 .451 .353 1.063 
one-four .377 .329 .239 9.45 
one-six .178 .219 .239 6.36 
two-two .333 .302 .241 8.76 
two-six .223 .195 .222 6.40 
three-two .254 .~83 .331 8.68 
three-four .162 .168 .195 5.25 
three-six .251 .093 .158 5.02 
Total .246 .~56 .248 7.50 
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Table 6 
Summary of Analysis of Variance for 
Untenable Hypotheses 
Source df ~ MS F 
Problems (P' 2 .3144 .1572 2.2172 
Hypotheses (8) 2 .6007 .3004 4.231* 
P x H 4 .1058 .0266 
Error (B) 81 5.7421 .0709 
Trials (T) 2 .0055 .0029 
TxP 4 .1072 .0268 
T x H 4 .1038 .0260 
TxPxH 8 .3448 .0431 
Error (W) 162 7.0235 .0433 
*1'(.05 
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Table 7 
Mean Times to Solution for the Nine 
Discussion Conditions for Three Problems 
Discussion Trials 
Problems-Hypotheses 1 2 3 Total 
one-two 12.1 10.1 7.2 29.4 
one-four 11.9 10.0 5.2 27.1 
one-::;:i'S{ 10.0 5.8 4.7 20.6 
two-two 10.6 7.7 4.7 23.0 
two-four 9.6 7.6 6.2 23.4 
two-six 12.4 6.1 4.7 23.2 
three-two 11.2 8.8 7.0 27.0 
three··four 9.9 7.0 5.1 22.0 
three-six 10.4 7.2 6.4 24.0 
Total 10.91 7.81 5.69 24.41 
20 
Table 8 
Summary of Analysis of Variance 
for Time to Solution 
Source df SS MS F 
Problems (P) 2 31. 341 15.6705 1.0245 
Hypotheses (II) 2 75.652 37.8260 
P x H 4 105.704 26.4261 
Error (B) 81 2,990.566 36.9206 
Trials (T) 2 1,241. 564 620. 782 29.5633··· 
T x P 4 28.725 7.1814 
T x H 4 53.081 13.2703 
T x P x H 8 63.653 7.'1456 
Error (\:.J') 162 3,401. 734 20.9984 
••• ~ (.001 
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Correlations between the response measures (card choices to solution, 
focusing strategy, untenable hypotheses, and time to solution) over all 
conditions, both for individual problems and summing over the three trials, 
are presented in Table 9. 
Discussion 
The major purpose of this experiment was to examine tlle role of 
discussion in the concept attainment situation. Previous evidence had well 
established its importance in group problem solving (e.g. Hoffman, 1961; 
Maier & Solem, 1952). Basically the results were as expected: increasing 
amounts of discussion had significant effects in facilitating the problem 
solving process. This was indicated by decreasing numbers of card choices, 
incressing focusing scores, and decreasing numbers of untenable hypotheses. 
Laughlin and Doherty (1967) and Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) had also noted 
the importance of discussion in concept attainment with similar results. 
As Laughlin and Doherty (1967) had noted, the benefits of discussion 
seem to involve an inference and monitoring process, in which the two 
persons can both reason concerning the meaning of each card choice and 
hypothesis and check each other. Through discussion they can reduce 
erroneous inference and insure more efficient card choices, thus solving 
the problems in fewer card choices and making fewer untenable hypotheses. 
The differing effects of discussion over problems and discussion over 
hypotheses found in this experiment offer an explanation of the discussion 
process in concept attainment. As discussion was allowed over more hypotheses 
the number of card choices to solution decreased and the percentage of 
untenable hypotheses decreased. As disaussion was allowed over more problems, 
the card choices to solution decreased and the incidence of focusing 
22 
Table 9 
Intercorrelations of Response Measures 
Individual Problems Focusing Un. Hypotheses Time 
Card Choices 
-.67 .67 .59 
Focusing 
-.70 -.39 
Un. Hypotheses 
.33 
SumminS Over Problems Focusing Un. Hypotheses Time 
Card ChoieflS -.71 .69 .54 
Focusing 
-.77 -.33 
Un. Hypotheses 
.27 
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increased. The percentage of untenable hypotheses was influenced more by 
discussion over hypotheses than by discussion over problems; and focusing 
reflected variation in discussion over problems more than discussion over 
hypotheses. Card choices to solution--the basic dependent measure (Laughlin 
and Doherty, 1967)--however, was influenced b:, 'both discussion over problems 
and discussion over hypotheses. 
These results suggest that the discussion process in the concept attain-
ment situation can be separated into different functions. The two response 
measures of focusing strategy and percentage of untenable hypotheses reflected 
the different functions of discussion. Card choices, the more basic indicator, 
reflected both functions. 
It seems that as subjqcts were allowed discussion over more hypotheses, 
they were better able to reduce the number of mistake. made (in terms of 
untenable hypotheses). If a person who perceives an untenable hypothesis on 
the part of his partner is free to correet it through verbal interaction under 
discussion conditions, it follows that the more hypotheses on which discussion 
1s allowed, the smaller the percentage of untenable hypotheses will be, 
(providing, of course, that the mistake is perceived). But assuming that the 
perception of errors equal across all conditions, the manipulation of dis-
cussion can be seen to have direct effect on the percentage of untenable 
hypotheses. What is most important, is the fact that discussion over hypo-
theses is most responsible for the reduction of untenable hypotheses. 
Aa subjects are allowed more discussion over problems, however, they are 
given the opportunity to discuss more of the complete proeess. An increase 
in discussion over hypotheses does not always reflect this, but any increase 
in discussion over problems reflects prior experience in solving at least 
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one problem. Discussion under these conditions, Le. after prior relevant 
problem solving experience, would then, based on experience, be of a more 
sophis ticated, and therefore more profitable, nature in terms of overall 
strategy. 
It should be noted that the results of increased discussion over problems 
renorted here, i.e. increased focusing, do not imply the superiority of that 
strategy over scanning, but rather only increased efficiency. For Laughlin 
and Doherty (1967) noted, discussion facilitates the effective utilization of 
whatever strategy is used, whether fOCUSing, or scanning. 
Tn summary, then, the discussion process in concept attainment can be 
seen as having two main effects, avoidance of mistakes or untenable hypotheses, 
and adoption and utilization of an efficient strategy. While there was no 
effect of discussion on time to solution, there were highly significant 
transfer effects over all three problems in regard to time. This is a curious 
result in view of the fact that none of the other response measures reflected 
any transfer effects. There is some question as to whether time to solution 
should be considered a response measure in terms of performance. Laughlin and 
Doherty (1967) and Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) both found fewer card choices, 
lower percentages of untenable hypotheses, and more efficient use of strate-
gies with diSCUSSion, yet more time to solution. This paralleled the results 
of Laughlin (1965) which indicated that groups required more time than 
. 
individuals. This study failed to replicate this effect of discussion on time, 
however, and raised some question as to what time to solution is measuring. A 
possible e~lanation (McGlynn, 1968) is that time, which subjects were in-
structed to ignore, may be taken as a mea»ure of organization and coordination 
as much as a measure of performance. If time is taken as a measure of 
25 
organization, then, the results can be used to support the usual failure to 
find transfer effects in selection paradigm experiments. 
As Laughlin and Jordan (1967) noted: transfer is commonly found in 
reception paradigm studies (e.g. Neisser and Weene, 1962; Wells, 1962; Wells 
and Watson, 1965; Haygood and Bourne, 1965), but not in selection paradigm 
studies (e.g. Bruner et a1., 1956; Conant and Trabasso, 1964; Laughlin, 1966). 
The failure of the present study to find any transfer effects for card 
choices, focusing, or percentage of untenable hypotheses is in essential 
agreement with this observation. 
While the consideration of time as a measure of organization and coordi-
nation helps to clear up the situation somewhat, there is still seemingly no 
explanation for the failure of the previously cited selection paradigm 
experiments to find transfer effects for time to solution. Nor does there 
seem to be an explanation for the finding of the Laughlin and McGlynn (1968) 
study of transfer effects for all measures, including time to solution. 
The correlations between response measures are substantially the same 
for individual problems and for the sum of each group's three problems. 
These correlations are very close to those reported by McGlynn (1968) for 
conjunctive problems given to cooperative groups. The correlations in this 
study are also in general agreement with those reported in Laughlin and 
Jordan (1967) and Laughlin (1966), though somewhat higher than those of the 
latter study. In comparison with the Laughlin and Doherty (1967) study, 
though, the correlations reported here are consistently much higher, with 
one cemplete.'reversal. The Laughlin and Doherty study reported a correlation 
of -.33 between time to solution and card choices, whereas the present study 
found a positiva eorrelation between these ~ measures of .59. This is 
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curious in view of the fact that both studies used conjunctive problems in 
group situations. Both studies also varied the amount of discussion allowed, 
though the Laughlin and Doherty study used either full discussion or no 
discussion conditions. 
The difference in the time-card choice correlations are reflected in the 
different findings of the two studf.es concerning discussion and transf.ar 
effects on time to solution. While both studies found that discussion 
resulted in fewer card choices, more focusing, and lower percentage of 
untenable hypotheses, the Laughlin and Doherty study found more time to 
solution and the present study did not. And while both studies found no 
transfer effects in terms of card choices, strategy, or untenable hypotheses, 
the Laughlin and Doherty study found no transfer effect for time to solution 
either, whereas the present study did. 
The agreement of these two experiments on correlations of other resp0nse 
measures, at least aa to uniform direction, and the substantial similarity of 
results other than those concerning time to solution raise further question 
as to the consideration of time as a measure of performance ••• at least in 
terms of cognitive efficiency. 
Summary 
The effects of varying amounts of discussion on concept attainment 
strategies and interproblem transfer were investigated for three I successive 
three-attribute conjunctive problems. Using the selection presentation 
method. 1ndividuals in two-person cooperative groups alternated in selecting 
successive instance3 from an array ~ontaining all possible instances and in 
making e8~h accompanying hypothesis. This alternation took place under both 
conditions: where diacussion~was or was not allowed. The stimulus display 
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was a six-qttribute, two-value systematic array of 64 cards. t'. 3 x 3 x 3 
repeated measures factorial design was used with the variables: (1) discuss-
ion allowed on problems (first, first and second. all three), (2) discussion 
allowed on hypotheses (first two, first four. first six), (3) problems 
(three €or each pair). 
Increasing amounts of discussion significantly decreased the number of 
card choices to solution, increased the incidence of focusing, decreased the 
percentage of untenable hypotheses, but had no effect on the time to solution. 
Tncreases in discussion over problems and discussion over hypotheses had 
different effects: the former resulted in'reduction of the percentage of 
untenable hypotheses, the latter resulted in a higher incidence of focusing, 
"hile both resulted in fewer card choices to solution. 
There was a highly significant transfer effect over all three problems 
founu !or time to solution. No other transfer effects were found. It was 
suggested that perhaps time might better be considered a measure of organiza-
tion and cooperation within the group, rather than as a performance indica-
tive of cognitive efficiency. 
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Instructions 
31 
This is an experiment in thinking. There are 64 cards on this board, 
arranged in 8 rows if 8 cards each and numbered from one to 64. These cards 
are all the possible combinations made by taking six colors, .each color 
being either a plus or a minus. (The 6 colors were pointed out, each as a 
plus and a minus.) The colors are called attributes, and the plus or minus 
signs are called values. 
Thase c8L'ds can be grouped together or categorized in a large number of 
possible ways by following a specified rule. The rule defines a concept, and 
a concept is the group of all cards that satisfy the rule. 
The rule is that the card must have a particular value (plus or minus) 
on one color, a particular value on another color, and a particular value on 
a third color. For example, all the cards with a blue plus, an orange plus, 
and a green minus are the concept ''blue plus, oTange plus, and green minus." 
Or, all the cards with a black minus, a green plur., and s red ?lus are the 
concept "black minus, ff,reen plus, and red plus." 
In the problems I will have some concept in mind, and your job is to 
determine what it is. I'll start you off by giving you the number of one 
of the cards that is included in the concept; that is, one of the cards that 
exemplify the concept I have in mind. Then you will select any card you 
wish in order to get information as to whether the card you select is also 
included in the concept. If the card you selected is included in the concept, 
I will say "yes," and if the card you selected is not included in the concept, 
I will say "no". To be included it must have all three attributes and values 
specified in the rule. (An example was given of a card that only partially 
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satisfied the rule.) 
Then you will make a hypothesis as to what concept you then think I have 
in mind. If your hypothesis is correct, I'll say "ves," and you've solved 
the problem. If your hypothesis is not correct, I'll say "no". A "no" means 
that your hypothesis is not entirely correct. It may be entirely wrong, or 
it may be partly correct. (A parallel example to the one given previously 
was given of a partially correct hypothesis.) 
If I say "no," you select another card, and again I'll say "yes" or 
"no" depending upon whether the card you select is included in the concept, 
and again you will make a hypothesis and I'll say "yes" or "no" to the 
hypothesis. So, you just keep repeating the procedure of selecting a card 
and making a hypothesis, selecting another card and making another hypothesis, 
until you've solved the problem. 
Now you're going to be working together on the problems, so you can 
discuss your card choices and hypotheses all you want ••• up to a point. After 
that ••• after I tell you no more d1..scusaic,n is allowed ••• you'll still be 
working together, but discussion will no longer be allowed. To prepare for 
this, you are to alternate in actually saying each card choice and hypothesis 
from the beginning of each problem. For instance, if you were to start 
(pointing to one subject) you would make the first card choice and accom-
panying hypothesis verbally, though you might have decided upon it together. 
Then it would be your turn to say the next card and hypothesis (pointing to 
the other). You must establish the pattern of alternating because at some 
point during the problem I will stop the discussion after which you may not 
communicate except through your card choices and hypotheses. 
There are three problema in all, and the object is to solve each 
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problem in the fewest number of card choices, regardless of time. 
The concept rule was reiterated and the reference card placp.n in front 
of the subjects. Any questions were then answered. 
At the beginning of the second and third problems subjects were told 
that they could begin discUSSing again. 
At: th~ ~o1.nt at which discussion was to end for each problem subjects 
were told: "from now on, no more discussion will be allowed; all you may 
say now is card numbers and hypotheses, in turn." 
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